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To answer the question “How to be an Ecological Economist”, we must start by defining 
the field of Ecological Economics. Mainstream Economics altogether lacks the concepts 
required to deal adequately with nature, justice and time. It was the absence of these three 
concepts in this otherwise great social science that led to the establishment of Ecological 
Economics. The interest in nature, justice and time is its defining characteristic. The main 
thesis of this paper is that our field is a fragile institution and that the professional 
existence of an ecological economist is no less fragile. However, this very fragility also 
represents freedom, scope for free thinking, conceptualising and research. Nevertheless, to 
be able to really use and in turn enjoy the full scope of this freedom, an ecological 
economist needs certain specific characteristics, in particular what is termed in the 
German philosophical tradition “Urteilskraft” and in English “power of judgement”. A 
description of these characteristics is developed in this paper, providing an answer to the 
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* Invited Lecture, 7
th International Conference of the European Society for Ecological Economics, Integrating 
Natural and Social Sciences for Sustainability, 5-8
th June 2007, UFZ, Leipzig, Germany. 
I am very much indebted to my two coauthors of many years’ standing, the philosophers Reiner Manstetten and 
Thomas Petersen without whose help I could not have written this lecture. I would also like to thank the 
following for their assistance and constructive criticism: Stefan Baumgärtner, Christian Becker, Isabel Edler, 
Jens Faber, Katherine Farrell, Eduard Gruber, Bruce Hannon, Jörg Hüfner, Frank Jöst and Bernd Klauer, 
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Overview of the lecture 
This lecture is based on my personal experiences. I became an ecological economist during 
the course of four decades. I started my academic education by studying mathematical 
economics and statistics. From the start of my professional career, I was unsatisfied with the 
way Mainstream Economics dealt with the concept of time. For this reason, I turned my 
attention to Austrian capital theory, which takes the temporal aspect as its focal point. 
I was also unsatisfied with the manner in which political and natural aspects were treated and 
therefore decided to focus on questions of political economy and of physics. However, it took 
another decade before I dared to apply elements of political philosophy and thermodynamics 
in my approach to fundamental questions of Ecological Economics. Since I had a chair for 
economic theory at the University of Heidelberg, I was teaching Ecological Economics and 
hardcore Mainstream Economics topics at the same time. I also began to experience more and 
more the difficulties of being an ecological economist. How to be an ecological economist? I 
would like to approach this question from the starting point of Mainstream Economics. 
The field has three fundamental deficits, and I know what I am talking about, because I was 
and to certain extent still I am a mainstream economist. The three deficits are, first, the lack of 
an adequate conceptualisation of nature, second, a failure to handle the question of justice and 
third, a failure to deal with the dynamics of time. These three deficits gave rise to the 
establishment of Ecological Economics and explain how Ecological Economics differs from 
Mainstream Economics. In my understanding two constitutive elements of Ecological 
Economics are normative in character: these are the dignity of nature and justice. From a 
methodological point of view I shall argue that the temporal dimension, i.e. time, is of great 
importance in our field. 
To sum up: interest in nature, justice and time are the essential characteristics of Ecological 
Economics. These three issues are central to the main task of an ecological economist; it is 
above all the task of advising society and government. However, Ecological Economics is not 
able to deal with these three demands in a purely scientific way. This statement by no means 
implies that Ecological Economics stands outside all science. On the contrary, I believe that 
the term “Ecological Economics” constitutes a field of fruitful ideas and approaches to 
research for experts in various disciplines – from natural sciences to social sciences and from 
philosophy to theology. Research in this direction profits if scientists are willing to enter a 
  3genuinely interdisciplinary dialogue which is also open to non-scientists. The scientific 
qualities of an ecological economist must be supplemented by personal ones. Beside a high 
degree of scientific professionalism, ecological economists require four qualities: first, the 
conviction that their task is highly important, second, the confidence that they are able to 
develop ideas and solutions for the seemingly unsolvable questions they are confronted with 
and third, the patience and perseverance to withstand setbacks and failures. Over and above 
these qualities comes a fourth, which we find in everyday life, but which is rarely mentioned 
in scientific discourse. A successful politician, a wise judge, an effective manager and a good 
scientific adviser all have in common that their decisions and counsel cannot be deduced 
entirely from scientific concepts. What distinguishes them is the quality termed in the German 
philosophic tradition “Urteilskraft”, in English “power of judgement”,  “prudence” or 
“practical wisdom”. An ecological economist requires a generous portion of this quality of 
power of judgement. 
 
1. How does Ecological Economics differ from Mainstream 
Economics? 
After this overview, I would now like to turn to the question: how does Ecological Economics 
differ from Mainstream Economics? While the representatives of ecology have few, if any, 
difficulties with Ecological Economics, the relationship between Mainstream Economics and 
Ecological Economics is not quite so harmonious. Why is this? The answer is: the mainstream 
economist views nature as a subsystem of the economy, whereas the Ecological Economist 
takes quite the opposite view. To explain how this state of affairs came about, it is revealing 
to look back over the last three centuries, during which we can observe steady economic 
growth in many countries, at least in the long term: Material shortages have disappeared to a 
significant extent in developed countries and material welfare, which was available only to a 
few in earlier times, is within the means of many today. The collapse of the planning systems 
in socialist countries has demonstrated the extent to which economic growth depends on the 
organisation of a market economy. It is to the credit of Mainstream Economics that it has 
recognized the dynamic efficiency of market systems and revealed the deficiencies of socialist 
planning societies. However, the undreamt of innovativeness and strength of market 
economies has come hand in hand with undreamt of difficulties. Environmental problems 
have taken on enormous dimensions and inequality of income distribution is on the increase. 
  4As mentioned above, Mainstream Economics has three fundamental weaknesses in handling 
environmental and resource issues satisfactorily: (1) the lack of an adequate conceptualisation 
of nature and (2) of justice and (3) the failure to adequately deal with time. 
 
1.1 Conceptualising nature in modern times 
To be fair to Economics, the criticism that it fails to conceptualise nature in an adequate 
manner can be said to apply to all modern sciences. The natural philosopher Friedrich 
Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1809), put it this way at the beginning of the 19
th century: „All 
modern European philosophy since its beginning with Descartes (i.e. since the seventieth 
century, M.F.) has one common failing in that nature is not present in it.“ (My translation) 
1 
At first glance, one can only wonder at this statement, for since the time of Francis Bacon 
(1561-1626), all philosophies and natural sciences placed nature at the centre of their 
explanatory systems. What does it mean then to say that nature does not appear in this 
philosophy and this science, where on the other hand it is omnipresent? 
To answer this question we have first to clarify what does nature mean in this context? In 
everyday life, nature is understood as the part of the world not made by human hand. In our 
normal experience, nature is something independent. This independence of nature led some 
philosophers and poets, particularly those belonging to the romantic movement, like Goethe, 
Wordsworth, Novalis, Schelling and Thoreau, to perceive nature as the independent basis of 
life in all its forms. In their view nature has an aim in itself and is constantly at work 
developing higher life-forms, so that beings are ultimately able to reflect on themselves. The 
experience of nature as a fountain of life and development beyond human planning led these 
thinkers to an attitude of universal gratefulness. In contrast, as Schelling noted, the 
representatives of modern science in their majority seemed blind to this independence of 
nature. These sciences were concerned solely with the task of searching for laws that 
determine nature, in order to command natural processes. For them, nature was no longer 
something independent in its own right. Instead, nature is nothing more than material for 
humans and their wants. 
This approach still forms the basis of modern natural sciences as well as Economics. For 
example, let us consider the founder of modern economics, Adam Smith (1723-1790). He 
assumed that nature would not impose any limits on the endeavour to increase productivity 
                                                 
1 "Die ganze neu-europäische Philosophie seit ihrem Beginn (durch Descartes) hat diesen gemeinschaftlichen 
Mangel, daß die Natur für sie nicht vorhanden ist." (Schelling 1809/1997: 28 f.) 
  5further and further by division of labour and technical progress. Karl Marx followed on from 
Adam Smith in his hope that material wealth could be increased indefinitely. In the 
communist economy, Marx expected to find an economy that is able to give everyone what 
they want. It never occurred to either Smith or Marx that nature, which provides the raw 
material for this wealth, might resist this human striving for continuous growth. Today, nature 
is viewed in Mainstream Economics solely as a provider of resources and services. Nature as 
such does not appear. Bertram Schefold (2000) one of Germany's leading economists, said
2: 
“As an editor of a series of hundred classics of economics I have not found any single 
(economics, M.F.) book, in which nature is at the centre of political economy..." (My 
translation). 
 
1.2 The dispensability of considerations of justice
3
I will now proceed to show that this neglect of the constraints of nature has implied that the 
consideration of justice is also dispensable in Mainstream Economics. Generally speaking, 
from a philosophical point of view, justice relates to the idea of a good life of society: a just 
society is one whose members are able to live a good life, which also implies that a good life 
is in harmony with nature. The notion of a ‘good life’ is a holistic concept, which pertains to 
all important dimensions of social development, i.e. to politics, culture, education, the 
economy as well as to human interaction with nature.  
Early on, the classical economists narrowed down this wide notion of justice by reducing it to 
a question of income distribution. On this basis, it was logical to neglect the problem of 
justice increasingly over time. Their argument runs as follows: if the social income is high 
enough and distributed in such a way that all humans can satisfy their wants completely, i.e. if 
we are in a state of affluence, then justice as an issue vanishes. Such a state of affluence 
seems to be feasible, if one presupposes the possibility of indefinite growth, i.e. if one 
assumes that material wealth can be increased arbitrarily. In the 18
th century, this vision was 
formulated by the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) with wonderful clarity. 
Hume wrote about a state of affluence: 
“It seems evident that, in such a happy state, every other social virtue would flourish, and 
receive tenfold increase; but the cautious, jealous virtue of justice would never once have 
                                                 
2 The quotation continues as follows: "´Nature` is no concept of economic theory. It is only viewed as something 
like other economic concepts such as production, consumption, land, labour, utility, which supply us a restricted 
relationship concerning nature.” (My translation) 
3  The argument in this section was developed at length in Faber and Petersen (2006). 
  6been discussed of.” (Hume 1777/1975: 183f.). 200 years later, in 1930, John Maynard Keynes 
(1967: 366) wrote: „…the economic problem may be solved, or be at least within sight of 
solution, within a hundred years. This means that the economic problem is not – if we look 
into the future – the permanent problem of the human race.“
4 (Italics from the original) 
Hume, Marx and Keynes all thought: if sufficient goods are available, then the problem of 
justice no longer exists. In contrast to this view, Mainstream Economics considers non-
satisfaction to be an essential human trait. Hence, this discipline does not expect a communist 
land of milk and honey, but operates with the constitutive concept of scarcity. But scarcity 
means that there are not enough goods in relation to the demands of present human beings.
5 
Hence, modern economics by no means promises a land of milk and honey that eliminates 
scarcity. Nevertheless, there are parallels between the Mainstream Economics approach and 
Karl Marx’s view. 
mainstream economists do not view overcoming scarcity as the ultimate goal of history, as it 
was for Marx, but it is given a dynamically essential role: what is scarce today is not scarce 
anymore tomorrow thanks to the constant growth of an efficient economy. Tomorrow there 
will be new wants and new scarcities, only to be overcome the day after tomorrow. Since 
everyone will receive enough of everything in the course of time, inequalities in income are 
ultimately deemed to be of no relevance and thus, not to constitute a problem. The notion that 
expresses the hope of overcoming this dynamic scarcity is economic growth, the magic word 
in politics. It is for this reason that economists as political advisers place the focus of their 
counsel on growth as the remedy to all problems of justice.  If nature does not impose 
constraints on economic growth, then everyone can be promised increments of future 
economic growth. It follows that problems and conflicts relating to the justice of income 
distribution can be ignored. In this way, Mainstream Economics has been able to rid itself of 
the bothersome notion of a good life. 
 
                                                 
4 Keynes (1967: 365-6) made this statement under the following assumptions: ”I draw the conclusion that, 
assuming no important wars and no important increase in population, the economic problem may be solved, or 
be at least in sight of solution, within a hundred years“. 
5 In the language of Robbins (1932: 15) the definition of modern economics is: ”The economist studies the 
disposal of scarce means. He is interested in the way different degrees of scarcity of different goods give rise to 
different ratios of valuation between them, and he is interested in the way in which changes in condition of 
scarcity, whether coming from the demand side or the supply side – affect these ratios. Economics is the science 
which studies human behaviour between ends and scarce means, which have alternative uses.“ 
  71.3 Conceptualising time 
I turn now to the third deficiency of Mainstream Economics. Some of the best economists 
have noticed that their method of modelling time is inadequate. The well-known neoclassical 
capital theorist Robert Solow (1985:330) even wrote ironically: “There is a single universal 
model of the world. It only needs to be applied. You can drop a modern economist from a 
time machine – a helicopter, may be, like the one that drops money – at any time -, in any 
place, along with his or her personal computer, he or she could set up in business without 
even bothering to ask what time and which place.” Path dependency, invention, technical 
innovation and irreversibility are not handled sufficiently. For example, Paul Samuelson 
(1983:36) noted: “In theoretical economics there is no ´irreversibility` concept, which is one 
reason that Georgescu-Roegen (1971) is critical of conventional economics“. All the various 
attempts of Mainstream Economics to get a grip on time were commented by one of the 
leading economic theorists of the 20
th century, John Hicks (1965:47), who remarked: “The 
more precise capital theory became the more static it became….” This is why John Hicks 
turned away from Mainstream Economic capital theory and became one of the cofounders of 
neo-Austrian capital theory, where time is at the forefront of the analysis. After having 
explained the three deficits of Mainstream Economics, nature, justice and time, I shall now 
turn to Ecological Economics. 
 
2. What is Ecological Economics? 
Let me first summarise my view of Ecological Economics. In doing this, I am aware that my 
emphasis on normative issues in Ecological Economics can be debated. From my perspective, 
the interest in nature, justice
6 and time constitutes the defining characteristic of an ecological 
economist: this interest forms a unifying bond between ecological economists. The central 
goal of Ecological Economics is to contribute to justice in the wide sense as defined above. 
For Ecological Economics, justice means the idea of a good and sustainable life not only for 
humans, but for all beings. A just human social order includes the stipulation that it preserves 
itself and its natural foundations of its existences. If we are interested in justice, we should 
                                                 
6 Some may find it surprising that besides the interest in nature, I have given interest in justice such a 
predominant role in determining Ecological Economics. And, as a matter of fact, we find many more 
publications dealing with nature than with justice. But we should be always aware that studies on the 
environment without considerations of justice, at least in the motivation, do not belong to Ecological Economics. 
Of course, the opposite also holds true: papers on justice without a relationship to nature do not belong to our 
field. 
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Ecological Economics is by its very essence not only research- but also action-orientated. 
Therefore, ecological economists should be willing to give advice to government and society. 
The question of sustainability requires that particular attention be given to time. This is a 
specific characteristic of Ecological Economics: different time horizons, short-, medium- and 
long-term perspectives as well as irreversibility must be reckoned with in nature, economy 
and politics. 
From a normative perspective, Ecological Economics views nature and justice as closely 
connected. Ecological Economics is an attempt to consider economics and nature according to 
the prerequisite that besides the dignity of humans an independent “dignity of nature” has to 
be respected (Huber 1990: 233). This idea that the dignity of humans and the dignity of nature 
must simultaneously be respected can be considered the defining norm of Ecological 
Economics. There does not exist a trade-off between the dignity of nature and anything else: 
there does not exist a price for the dignity of nature. Viewed in this way, the task of 
Ecological Economics seems at first sight to be rather simple: Take care of nature and justice 
when giving advice and be sure that time structures are taken into account. 
However, this rule of thumb leads to great complications; for Ecological Economics has 
norms which go much further than those of Mainstream Economics so that ecological 
economists are confronted with a much more complex world. The world of Ecological 
Economics deals explicitly with the constraints of nature, for it acknowledges that in reality 
there are limits to the growth of real income. Hence, questions of just income distribution can 
neither be dispensed with by attaining boundless affluence, as the philosopher David Hume 
suggested, nor can they be diffused by unlimited economic growth as Mainstream Economics 
proposes, because growth is definitely limited by the constraints of nature. From this follows: 
increasing environmental degradation and scarcity of resources on the one hand and 
increasing conflicts regarding income distribution on the other hand seem to lead an adviser 
into a veritable minefield of insurmountable obstacles: hence, questions of sustainability seem 
to be unsolvable. 
 
2.1 The fragility of Ecological Economics as a field 
How is Ecological Economics as a field prepared for these challenges? Emphasising nature, 
justice and time opens a broad field of research, which is so far-reaching that no single 
scientific discipline is able to deal with all its tasks. It is therefore not surprising that a 
  9generally accepted theoretical framework or methodology for Ecological Economics has yet 
to be defined. Issues, methods and results give often the impression of a certain arbitrariness. 
As Inge Roepke (2005: 285) recently summarised: “The knowledge structure of the field as 
such is obviously not well structured and systematically organized”. She (2005: 286) 
concludes that “…the identity of the field is relatively weak.” Obviously, Ecological 
Economics as a field of research is a fragile one. 
 
2.2 A second fragility: excessive challenges to an ecological economist 
The fragility of Ecological Economics as a field augments the difficulty to which ecological 
economists are exposed, i.e. to face up to the great challenge of contributing to the good and 
sustainable life of humans and nature. They have to deal with very far-reaching norms, which 
have to be applied to large areas of uncertainties and ignorance. This goal is so complex and 
encompassing that it seems to demand a super-science, but instead ecological economists can 
not even rely on a well founded knowledge structure in their own field.
7
To summarise the implications of the two fragilities: the combination of a research field that 
is not well organised and the extensive demands of the task could easily cause an ecological 
economist to despair. This conclusion brings me back to the question of my lecture. 
 
3. How to be an ecological economist? 
I have proposed that there are two reasons why it is not easy to be an ecological economist.  
(1) The identity of the field is not well defined and  
(2) the task of an ecological economist is very demanding. 
 
3.1 Freedom of research 
At first sight, these two difficulties seem to present a bleak outlook. However, if our 
perspective was really so depressing, would so many of us have travelled to this 7
th 
International Conference of the European Society for Ecological Economics in Leipzig? What 
                                                 
7 I want to mention in passing that ecological economists are not the only academics who are burdened with their 
challenges of their endeavours. This is for example, the case for many who work in developing countries. 
 
  10is it that keeps a firm hold on us as ecological economists? We obviously sense that there is 
more to it. And as a matter of fact, the two disadvantages mentioned above have flip sides. 
For the two disadvantages open up a tremendous scope of freedom. Our interest in nature, 
justice and time widens our horizon of recognition beyond the narrow boundaries determined 
by the questions and methods of single disciplines. In my view, ecological economists enjoy a 
unique freedom in their thinking, creative conceptualising and research. However, to really 
make use of this freedom, ecological economists need confidence and conviction: confidence 
that the problems and tasks that Ecological Economics poses are really worth supporting and 
the conviction that they are willing to walk a long and sometimes lonely way to solve them. 
This attitude is supported by the recognition that the central questions of Ecological 
Economics are central questions for society and the sense that by simply doing their work, the 
scientists are contributing to an important goal for the whole of humankind. This insight 
releases motivational energy and satisfaction, which enables them to overcome apparently 
insurmountable difficulties. One does not gain fundamental insights like this once and for all. 
In the course of time they get lost in swells of doubt and anxiety. ecological economists 
therefore need a way of life that consistently renews these insights and allows them to regain 
them again and again. To summarise: to walk the path of an ecological economist, one needs 
an attitude of confidence and of courage to face all kind of discouragements. But the longer 
one travels this path, the more one experiences that one's confidence and courage is growing. 
We can see many examples of this if we look to the pioneers of Ecological Economics. 
 
3.2 Pathfinder: power of judgement 
All of what I have said concerns the motivation, willpower and strength required to walk the 
path of an ecological economist. However, if Ecological Economics is primarily an action-
oriented field, we need more than just these. First, we need orientation. Here the three general 
guidelines: nature, justice and time give us a general direction. However, these are only rules 
of thumb and so abstract that they are of little help in concrete situations. There is a big gap 
between our general guidelines and the concrete challenges of everyday life. This state of 
affairs is particularly awkward because the ecological economist has to act as an adviser. 
From a purely scientific point of view, this results in a depressing outlook, for purely 
scientific politics is not possible in Ecological Economics. Does it follow from this that an 
ecological economist’s advice is arbitrary? This is by no means the case; for the problem that 
confronts ecological economists is not as new as it looks: it has been known in the field of 
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political philosopher Hannah Arendt have examined it at length. 
From their philosophical perspective, situations dominated by complexity, uncertainty and 
ignorance can be tackled using a skill that is particular to humankind. This ability is termed 
Urteilskraft in German and in English ‘power of judgement’, ´prudence´ or ´practical 
wisdom´. Power of judgement is the source of practical wisdom and adequate judgement in 
concrete situations. Thus, adequate judgement leads to good decisions. In political 
philosophy, power of judgement is seen as the key capability to develop responsible and 
successful solutions even in situations dominated by complexity, uncertainty and ignorance. 
As the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1787/1982: 177) noted, the ability to make adequate 
judgements is a particular talent, which cannot be taught but only exercised. As Kant 
explained, a judgement is found not only by using the mind, but also by imagination and 
sense. It is for this reason that good judgements cannot be arrived at by simple deduction. 
What power of judgment is and how it operates cannot be explained generically, but can only 
be demonstrated in concrete cases. This implies that good judgements cannot be developed 
using special methods. 
In real life, good physicians, competent judges, good homemakers, truly successful politicians 
and good scientific researchers exhibit power of judgement. Justifications for their actions can 
never be derived solely through analytical reasoning. Their expertise derives from personal 
experience, learning by doing as well as from some general guidelines. Good judgement is 
required in order to ensure that openness does not turn into chaos and that freedom does not 
turn into arbitrariness. Different aspects exist pertaining to the activity of power of judgement 
in different areas and disciplines. What does this mean in Ecological Economics? I propose 
that there are two prerequisites and two specific skills. The first prerequisite is 
professionalism. It is very useful to have been exposed to a good education in one discipline 
and subsequently gain a reputation in one’s own field. This ensures that one has at one’s 
command the ability to apply the methods of one’s discipline professionally. Further, it 
enables one to distinguish what one knows from what one does not know. This is important, 
for otherwise there is a considerable danger of amateurishness. So much for professionalism. 
I would now like to turn to the first skill of power of judgement. This is the capability to 
engage in transdisciplinary dialogue and interdisciplinary cooperation. A certain familiarity 
with the disciplines of one’s co-workers is necessary for truly interdisciplinary work. Since 
the available knowledge is often insufficient, interdisciplinary research cooperation demands 
  12teaching and learning on both sides. Compared to joint research within one area, 
interdisciplinary work is cumbersome, because it is one thing to lecture students, another to 
give an elementary introduction to a specialist in another field, and still another again to be 
taught perhaps by someone who is much younger than oneself and sometimes not yet even 
established in their own discipline. 
Only when the economist has mastered the relevant area of ecology and not simply read an 
introductory text, and only when the ecologist is familiar and comfortable with the relevant 
economic theory, can fruitful dialogue take place (cf. Faber/Manstetten/Proops 1996: 200). 
Such a dialogue often allows researchers to take into account various aspects that help 
identify solutions that might otherwise be overlooked by one representative of a single 
discipline. 
The second skill of the factual ‘power of judgement’ in Ecological Economics is sensitivity to 
different temporal structures. We not only need to be able to analyse problems under 
stationary or quasi-stationary conditions but also under truly dynamic circumstances. The 
relationships between different time horizons in ecosystems and economic systems are of 
central importance. When dealing with time, one must always use concepts that address how 
to deal with risk, uncertainty and ignorance, because the concept of time makes one sensitive 
to the limits of one’s own knowledge. In addition, ecological economists become aware that 
the time dimension includes a normative element, since one cannot avoid making, at least, 
implicitly evaluative decisions: how many generations shall be taken care of, i.e. what length 
of time horizon should be selected? Should a social discount rate be applied or not? And if so, 
how high should it be? 
To deal with time in Ecological Economics we can learn a lot from Georgescu-Roegen (1971: 
Chapter 9). He showed how it is possible to get to grips with time. He used a thermodynamic 
perspective and employed the concepts of stocks, flows and funds in a congenial manner 
(Wodopia 1986,  Faber/Proops/Speck 1999; Faber/Frank/Klauer/Manstetten/Schiller/Wissel 
2005).  Finally, I want to remark, that ecological economists can learn about time from 
Evolutionary Economics. 
I now turn to the second prerequisite of ‘power of judgement’. I call it the quality of 
attentiveness. Scientists are used to thinking in abstractions and models. We select and filter 
reality. This ability is an essential part of our professionalism, but as ecological economists 
we cannot restrict ourselves to only this kind of activity in developing our perspective. 
Complimentary to our professionalism, which forces us to abstract, we need the ability to 
  13experience unfiltered what we see, feel, smell, hear and taste in nature. This unfiltered 
awareness is what I mean by attentiveness. For only if we are attentive to the dimensions of 
real life can we make sure that our choice of scientific lens for observing the world does not 
altogether obscure our true problem of caring for nature and justice. 
 
4. Summing up 
To sum up: Interdisciplinary studies broaden our horizon, time further expands our 
perspective. However, we must be aware that this broadening involves a risk of arbitrariness. 
Here, the power of judgement protects ecological economists. While it is an important aspect 
of judgement, professionalism alone runs the risk of fostering narrowness. Sensitivity to time 
not only expands our perspective, it also reinforces humility, by forcing us to face up to our 
own ignorance. Attentiveness to the Gestalt of Ecological Economics problems leads to 
openness, safeguarding against narrowness. If all these qualities are truly cultivated by 
ecological economists, then the two fragilities of the institutional structure and the excessive 
demands of the task of an ecological economist can be turned into strengths: Ecological 
economists will blossom and Ecological Economics will flourish. 
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